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ARBITRATION’S SUMMER SOLDIERS MARCHING
INTO FALL: ANOTHER LOOK AT EISENBERG,
MILLER, AND SHERWIN’S EMPIRICAL STUDY
OF ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN CONSUMER
AND NONCONSUMER CONTRACTS
Nancy S. Kim ∗ & Chii-Dean Lin † ‡
ABSTRACT
Our empirical study examines the role and importance of arbitration
clauses in standard form contracts, primarily with other businesses. While
much has been written about the impact of mandatory arbitration clauses in
consumer contracts, relatively little has been written on mandatory
arbitration clauses in customer agreements where the customer was a
business and not an individual consumer. In this Article, we specifically
address the findings presented in Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey Miller, and
Emily Sherwin’s study, Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study
of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts. 1 Our
study finds that many businesses employ mandatory arbitration clauses in
their customer contracts with other businesses. Our study also suggests that
the primary reason for mandatory arbitration clauses in customer contracts
where the customer is a business is the avoidance of expenses associated
with litigation. Our study may help companies to better understand attitudes
about arbitration and assist in contract negotiations. The results of our study
may also help courts determine whether arbitration clauses in merchant
form agreements––and changes to those clauses––are “material” under
section 2-207(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code.
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† Associate Professor, Dept. of Mathematics and Statistics, San Diego State University.
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European ProActive Law Symposium, Oct. 14–15, 2009, sponsored by ICN Business School, in
partnership with CEREFIGE, Universite Nancy 2, IACCM, and ProActive Think Tank, where some of
the findings in this study were presented. The authors also thank Dan O’Connor for research assistance.
1. Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily Sherwin, Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers:
An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 871 (2008) [hereinafter Eisenberg et al.].
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INTRODUCTION
The Contracts Section of the Association of American Law Schools
hosted a panel at the 2008 Annual Meeting addressing the topic of
mandatory arbitration clauses. 2 The panel specifically focused on the use of
empirical evidence to determine whether arbitration was better or worse
than litigation for individual claimants. 3 The presentation papers were
eventually published in a symposium issue of the University of Michigan
Journal of Law and Reform. 4 In this Article, we specifically address the
findings presented in one of these symposium articles. Theodore Eisenberg,
Geoffrey Miller, and Emily Sherwin in their paper, Arbitration’s Summer
Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and
Nonconsumer Contracts, compare the use of arbitration clauses in 26
consumer contracts and 164 nonconsumer contracts. 5 The authors conclude
that the data suggests arbitration clauses in consumer contracts may be an
effort to preclude aggregate consumer action. 6
At the time that Eisenberg, Miller, and Sherwin were conducting their
study, we were conducting our own survey of company attitudes toward
mandatory arbitration clauses in standard business contracts. Our study
sought to determine the importance of arbitration clauses to companies and
whether companies would be willing to negotiate such clauses. Given that
most businesses do not negotiate standard agreements with consumers, we
created a survey to test attitudes about the role and importance of arbitration
clauses in standard form contracts primarily with other businesses. While
much has been written about the impact of mandatory arbitration clauses in
consumer contracts, 7 relatively little has been written on mandatory
arbitration clauses in customer agreements where the customer was a

2. Association of American Law Schools, 2008 Annual Meeting: Reassessing Our Roles as
Scholars and Educators in Light of Change Friday Program, http://www.aals.org/am2008/friday/index.html
(last visited Mar. 1, 2010).
3. Id.
4. See Omri Ben-Shahar, How Bad Are Mandatory Arbitration Terms?, 41 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 777 (2008); Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Forum Accessibility: Empirical
Evidence, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 813 (2008); Eisenberg et al, supra note 1; Theodore St. Antoine,
Mandatory Arbitration: Why It’s Better Than It Looks, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 783 (2008); W. Mark
Weidemaier, From Court-Surrogate to Regulatory Tool: Re-Framing the Empirical Study of
Employment Arbitration, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 843 (2008).
5. Eisenberg et al., supra note 1, at 881.
6. Id. at 985; see also discussion infra Part I.
7. See, e.g., Amy J. Schmitz, Legislating in the Light: Considering Empirical Data in
Crafting Arbitration Reforms, 15 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (discussing how empirical
studies of consumer contracts can inform policies regarding arbitration disclosure regulations).
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business and not an individual. The results of our survey are particularly
interesting in light of Eisenberg, Miller, and Sherwin’s findings.
This Article proceeds in five parts. In Part I, we discuss the results of
Eisenberg, Miller, and Sherwin’s paper. In Part II, we explain our
methodology. In Part III, we summarize our survey results. In Part IV, we
compare our findings to the findings in Eisenberg, Miller, and Sherwin’s
article. We conclude that our data in conjunction with Eisenberg, Miller,
and Sherwin’s study indicate that companies are more likely to include
mandatory arbitration clauses to resolve disputes arising out of ordinary
business transactions rather than material transactions. Companies are also
more likely to include mandatory arbitration clauses in customer contracts
where the customer is a consumer. Their inclusion in business customer
contracts, however, suggest that companies use mandatory arbitration
clauses for a variety of reasons, not solely to avoid aggregate dispute
resolution. Our study may assist courts in determining whether the use of a
particular arbitration clause in a company’s standard form contract is a
“material” alteration under section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
I. SUMMARY OF EISENBERG, MILLER, AND SHERWIN’S FINDINGS
A. Data Description
Eisenberg, Miller, and Sherwin sought to determine whether firms
were consistent in their use of arbitration clauses across consumer and nonconsumer contracts. 8 They identified 21 large companies “in the
telecommunications, credit, and financial services industries.” 9 Most of
these companies were in Fortune magazine’s list of top 100 American
companies. 10 They collected the standard consumer agreements for these
companies through means such as the company website or by ordering a
product. 11 The authors also reviewed negotiated agreements of these same
companies, which were filed with the companies’ Form 8-K and Form 10-K
“during the period from January 1, 2006 to August 13, 2007.” 12 These
contracts, referred to as “material contracts” because they “materially affect
the financial condition of the company[,]” included stock purchase
agreements, credit and security agreements, employment agreements, loan
pooling and service agreements, and agreements relating to benefits for key
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Eisenberg et. al., supra note 1, at 876.
Id. at 880, 881.
Id. at 880.
Id.
Id.
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employees. 13 The authors then “coded both consumer agreements and
negotiated contracts for the presence of mandatory arbitration clauses . . .
.” 14 They also coded for other relevant provisions, such as jury trial
waivers; 15 however, for the purposes of our study, we focus exclusively on
their findings with respect to the arbitration clauses.
B. Empirical Results and Analysis
The authors found that 76.9% of the consumer agreements included
mandatory arbitration clauses compared to 6.1% of the nonconsumer,
material contracts that were not employment contracts. 16 Including
employment contracts, less than 10% of the nonconsumer material contracts
contained mandatory arbitration clauses. 17 Thus, they concluded that their
data established that large companies “overwhelmingly selected arbitration
as the method for resolving consumer disputes and permitted litigation as
the method for resolving business disputes.” 18 They stated:
The low rate of mandatory arbitration clauses in material
nonlabor contracts suggests that the companies in our data set did
not, in fact, view the purported advantages of arbitration as
compelling when it came to resolving important business-tobusiness disputes. This result suggests reasons for doubting the
arguments of some arbitration advocates, which would imply that
rational actors would always prefer arbitration over litigation. 19

They briefly entertain other, more pro-arbitration, explanations, such as
bargaining dynamics. 20 For example, parties may not demand mandatory
arbitration in order to avoid signaling that they are “inclined to breach the
contract” 21 or because they might anticipate that they may be able to agree
to arbitrate disputes when the occasion later arises. 22 They ultimately reject
these alternative explanations and conclude that “the simplest explanation is
the most plausible: the parties’ revealed preference indicates that
13.
14.
15.
16.
clauses. Id.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 881.
Id. at 882.
Id.
Id. at 883. They found that over 90% of employment agreements included arbitration
Id.
Id.
Id. at 887.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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arbitration, for them, is often seen as less desirable than litigation as a
means for resolving disputes.” 23
The authors also discuss the contrast between the high rates of
mandatory arbitration terms in consumer contracts with the low rates of
such terms in material nonemployment contracts and conclude that the
“most plausible explanation here is that companies wish to avoid aggregate
dispute resolution.” 24 Here also, the authors discuss and dismiss alternative
explanations for the differences in arbitration rates between consumer and
material non-labor contracts. 25 The first alternative explanation is that
because there is no bargaining over contract terms in consumer contracts,
there is no negative signaling of inclination to breach and thus, no reason to
“omit an arbitration clause.” 26 The authors find this explanation
“implausible.” 27 A second possible explanation that the authors consider is
that companies favor the litigation system for material contracts that “may
generate major litigation[,]” whereas they are willing to trade access to the
most costly and reliable litigation system for smaller consumer contracts
where there is less at risk. 28 In response, they state:
[I]t is not obvious why the tradeoff should favor arbitration for
small-scale disputes and litigation for large-scale ones (small
claims court may be just as inexpensive as arbitration, for
example). More importantly, the hypothesis has a somewhat
fictional quality because few consumers will in fact exercise their
rights under arbitration clauses. 29

The authors conclude that “concern over class actions remains the most
likely explanation for the prevalence of arbitration clauses in consumer
agreements.” 30 Furthermore, they believe that “the companies in our sample
do not view consumer arbitration as offering a superior combination of cost
savings, expeditious decision-making, consistency, and justice. Rather, they
view consumer arbitration as a way to save money by avoiding aggregate
dispute resolution.” 31

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id.
Id. at 888.
Id. at 890.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 894.
Id. at 894–95.
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The authors also state that “corporations’ selective use of arbitration
clauses against consumers, but not against each other, suggests that their
use of mandatory arbitration clauses may be based more on strategic
advantage than on a belief that corporations are better serving their
customers.” 32
II. Our Methodology and Data Description
A. The Sample
The International Association for Contract and Commercial
Management (IACCM) is a non-profit foundation that works with
corporations, and public and academic institutions to establish “best
practices” in contracting standards. 33 The membership of the IACCM is
comprised of individuals at various management levels from 1,600
corporations and public sector organizations in over 90 countries. 34 IACCM
members may elect to become part of a “Community of Interest.” These
“Communities of Interest are worldwide networks of professionals who
share particular areas of expertise.” 35 In June 2007, IACCM sent out, on our
behalf, a survey to members in the following Communities of Interest:
Contract Clauses, Model Agreements, Contract Standards, Dispute
Management, Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), Global &
International Agreements, and Sales Policy. 36 Ninety-seven members
responded to the survey. 37
The respondent companies were based all over the world, with twothirds of them headquartered in the United States, as set forth in Table 1:
Where is your company headquartered?
United States
Canada
Latin America
Europe

67%
3%
1%
19%

32. Id. at 895.
33. See IACCM Background, http://www.iaccm.com/background.php (last visited Feb. 9,
2010). For more information about the IACCM, see IACCM Home Page, http://www.iaccm.com (last
visited Jan. 25, 2010).
34. IACCM Background, supra note 33.
35. IACCM Community of Interest, http://www.iaccm.com/communities.php (last visited Mar.
26, 2010).
36. Id.
37. All survey questions and respondents’ answers to survey questions are on file with the
authors and the Vermont Law Review.
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4%
0%
6%

The customers of respondent companies were also based all over the
world, with the majority based in the United States, as set forth in Table 2:
Where are most of your customers based?
United States
Canada
Latin America
Europe
Africa
Asia
Other

60%
3%
0%
17%
0%
4%
16%

Respondent companies sold to both businesses and consumers, as set
forth in Table 3:
Does your company sell products and/or services to:
Businesses
Consumers
Both

56%
3%
41%

The amount of an average purchase made by a customer varied, as set
forth in Table 4:
What is the amount of an average purchase made by a customer?
$0 to $99
$100 to $999
$1,000 to $9,999
$10,000 to $99,999
$100,000 to $999,999
$1,000,000 or more

1%
6%
10%
15%
31%
37%

The companies represented the particular industries, as set forth in
Table 5:
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What industry is your company in?
Software / Technology
Services / Outsourcing
Oil / Gas / Utilities
Aerospace
Financial Services
Manufacturing
Electronics
Transport
Other

27%
16%
10%
7%
6%
9%
4%
1%
19%

The majority of respondents represented companies with gross annual
revenues above $500 million, as set forth in Table 6:
What are your company’s average gross annual revenues?
Less than $50 Million
$50M to $499M
$500M to $999M
$1B to $9B
$10B to $49B
$50B to $99B
More than $100 Billion

9%
11%
11%
26%
24%
9%
12%

The individual respondents held a variety of positions at their
companies, as set forth in Table 7:
What is your role/title at your company?
CXO 38
Vice-President
General Counsel/
Associate General Counsel
Director
Manager
Professional

2%
3%
14%
12%
40%
28%

In addition, 35% of respondents were licensed attorneys.

38. C-level executives are chief executive officers, chief financial officers, or chief operating
officers.
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Finally, 94% of respondents used standard form customer agreements
and 45% of those form agreements contained mandatory arbitration
clauses. 39 Of those respondents whose standard form agreements contained
mandatory arbitration clauses, 38% had headquarters in the United States
and 59% had headquarters in countries other than the United States. Thirtynine percent of the respondents using mandatory arbitration clauses had
customers based in the United States, compared to 57% with customer
bases outside the United States. 40
III. OUR SURVEY FINDINGS
The objective of our survey was to determine the importance of
mandatory arbitration clauses to businesses. A potential weakness in our
study is that our survey required respondents to self-report. The data we
receive is thus subject to flaws in perception or knowledge and bias. We
tried to minimize self-reporting problems by submitting our survey only to
members of a reputable international organization that have legitimate,
large corporations as members. The survey was sent out by IACCM and
was identified as a joint study with the academic institution of one of the
authors. 41 We explained the purpose of the survey in general terms as
“conducting research on the impact of mandatory arbitration clauses on
businesses” to avoid guiding responses. The estimated time for survey
completion was a short three minutes to encourage participation. Finally,
we promised anonymity.
We discuss (1) the substance and type of respondents’ mandatory
arbitration clauses; (2) the nature and extent of negotiated changes to
mandatory arbitration clauses; and (3) attitudes toward mandatory
arbitration. We also compare our survey findings with those set forth in the
Eisenberg, Miller, and Sherwin study.

39. To be more precise, 43 out of 96 respondents or 44.79% of the total respondents to the
question stated that their form agreements contained mandatory arbitration clauses; one of the
respondents declined to answer the question.
40. For all of our calculations, we used the software SAS to create the statistical frequency
table.
41. E-mail from Nancy S. Kim, Associate Professor, California Western School of Law and
Visiting Associate Professor, Rady School of Management, UCSD, to Michael Stanley, Production
Coordinator, Vermont Law Review, at Attachment 1 (Jan. 28, 2010, 8:30:00 EST) (on file with authors
and Vermont Law Review) [hereinafter Attachment 1].
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A. Substance and type of respondents’ mandatory arbitration clauses
Those survey respondents at companies with mandatory arbitration
clauses were asked whether their arbitration clause looked substantially
similar to the following clause:
The parties agree that any controversy or claim between the
parties which arises under this Agreement, shall be settled by
arbitration in accordance with the rules for commercial
arbitration of the American Arbitration Association (or a similar
organization) in effect at the time such arbitration is initiated. A
list of arbitrators shall be presented to the Claimant and
Respondent from which one will be chosen using the applicable
rules. The hearing shall be conducted in the [LOCATION],
unless both parties agree otherwise. The decision of the arbitrator
shall be final and binding upon all parties.
The prevailing party shall be awarded all of the filing fees
and related administrative costs. Administrative and other costs
of enforcing an arbitration award, shall be added to, and shall
constitute part of, the amount due pursuant to this Agreement. 42

Fifty-two percent of survey respondents answered affirmatively compared
to 48% of survey respondents who responded negatively.
Survey respondents were also asked to identify the arbitration
organization mentioned in their company’s mandatory arbitration clause,
and they responded as follows in Table 8:
What arbitration organization is mentioned in your company’s
mandatory arbitration clause (check all that apply):
American Arbitration Association (AAA)
National Arbitration Forum (NAF)
Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services (JAMS)
International Council for Commercial Arbitration (ICCA)
International Centre for Dispute Resolution (ICDR)
London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA)
Association for International Arbitration (AIA)
No organization is specified
Other

42. Id.

22%
0%
5%
4%
5%
13%
2%
7%
10%
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The vast majority of survey respondents stated that their company used
a paper contract, which required a signature, as set forth in Table 9:
What type of standard form agreement does your company use?43
Paper based contract with signature required
Paper based contract with no signature required
Electronic agreement with click acceptance required
Electronic agreement with no click acceptance required

90%
6%
10%
6%

B. Nature and Extent of Negotiated Changes to
Mandatory Arbitration Clauses
The survey asked respondents whether they permitted any changes to
their mandatory arbitration clauses. Only 5% of respondents “never”
permitted changes and only 6% “always” permitted changes. Of the
respondents who had mandatory arbitration clauses, the majority of
respondents permitted some type of change with varying degrees of
frequency, as set forth in Table 10:
Does your company allow changes to the mandatory arbitration
clause?
Always
Often
Sometimes
Rarely
Never

6%
15%
44%
31%
5%

The type of negotiated changes ranged from major changes, such as
removal of the mandatory arbitration clause altogether (28%), to minor
changes, such as grammatical or typographical changes (24%). “Mandatory”
arbitration clauses were not actually “mandatory” for 43% of respondents
who permitted major changes, such as deleting the clause or changing
arbitration from “mandatory” to “optional,” as set forth in Table 11:

43. Some companies use more than one form, which is why totals exceed 100%.
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If your company negotiates changes to the mandatory arbitration
clause, what type of changes are allowed? (check all that apply)
Deletion of the clause
Changing arbitration from mandatory to optional
Procedural or geographical changes
Grammatical or typographical changes
Allocation of the costs of arbitration
Other (please specify)

28%
15%
47%
24%
16%
10%

Eighty-five percent of respondents negotiated changes with their
business customers only; however, 15% negotiated changes with both
business and consumer customers. See Table 12:
If your company negotiates changes to the mandatory
arbitration clause, is it with:
Businesses only
Consumers only
Both Business and Consumers

85%
0%
15%

C. Company Attitudes toward Mandatory Arbitration
Fifty-six percent of respondents stated that the primary reason that
their companies used mandatory arbitration clauses was to reduce
litigation costs. See Table 13:
What is the primary reason for your company’s mandatory
arbitration clause? 44
Customer preference
To reduce litigation costs
Internal Law Department requirement
Don’t know
Other (please explain)

6%
56%
8%
0%
10%

The percentage is actually larger because many of the respondents who
marked “other” explained that reduction of litigation costs was only one of

44. The actual question in the survey was: “If you answered “yes” (to the preceding question
regarding whether the respondent’s company’s form agreement contained a mandatory arbitration
clause), what is the primary reason for the arbitration clause?” For purpose of brevity and clarity, we
have rephrased the question for this Article.
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several proffered reasons. In other words, they marked “other” to indicate
reasons in addition to reduction of litigation costs. For example, one
respondent stated as follows:
We have mandatory arbitration clauses in our online consumer
contracts to try to reduce litigation costs. We also have
mandatory arbitration in our international contracts. This is
primarily because we feel more comfortable in arbitration than in
a foreign court, but also because of the greater certainty of
enforcement of an arbitration award versus an award by a court.

Another respondent stated:
To both reduce litigation costs and also minimize the possibility
of detrimental publicity that court cases may cause.

A third respondent also marked “other” in order to include other
reasons in addition to reduction of litigation costs:
In addition to reduce litigation costs, it’s also to expedite the
process through ADR.

There were other reasons cited by respondents. For example, several
respondents cited the avoidance of jury trials:
To provide for a more sophisticated trier of fact than a jury (and
therefore, in theory, less uncertainty)- would use jury trial waiver
instead if enforceable in CA.
Confidentiality; avoiding jury trials in US; more businessoriented resolution of the dispute; ability to appoint one of the
arbitrators.
Avoid jury trials.

Other cited reasons included industry custom, confidentiality, and the
difficulty of enforcing judgments in foreign countries.
Of all the 97 respondents queried, 73% said that they, on behalf of their
companies, had signed another company’s agreement containing a
mandatory arbitration clause, whereas 27% had not. The 27% figure does
not, however, mean that the respondents’ companies had not signed another
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company’s arbitration agreement, but only that the individual respondent
had not signed the agreement on their company’s behalf.
For 33% of companies, the primary reason to permit changes to the
mandatory arbitration clause was customer insistence. Fifty-eight percent
did not view requested changes as “deal-breakers.” Interestingly, only 3%
accommodated requested changes because they believed that their
competitors permitted such changes. See Table 14:
What is the primary reason your company permits changes to the
mandatory arbitration clause?
Customer insistence
It is not viewed internally as a deal-breaking change
We believe competitors routinely allow changes
Other (please specify)

33%
58%
3%
5%

Finally, 45% of respondents believed that mandatory arbitration
clauses were “very important” or “important.” See Table 15:
In general, how important do you think the mandatory
arbitration clause is to your company?
Very important
Important
Somewhat Important
Not very important
Not at all important

11%
34%
28%
16%
11%

D. Arbitration Clauses and Product Pricing
Inclusion of mandatory arbitration provisions in company agreements
generally did not affect the commercial terms of the transaction. Seventyeight percent of respondents stated that the inclusion of a mandatory
arbitration clause does not affect their company’s standard product pricing.
See Table 16.
Does the inclusion of the mandatory arbitration clause affect your
company’s product pricing?
Yes
No
Don’t know

8%
78%
14%
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Where the company permitted a change to the mandatory arbitration
clause, 51% said that accommodating such a request never affected pricing
to that customer, and 39% said it rarely affected pricing to the requesting
customer. See Table 17:
If your company permits changes to the mandatory arbitration
clause at a customer’s request, does it affect the price charged to
that customer?
Always
Often
Sometimes
Rarely
Never

0%
0%
10%
39%
51%

E. The Materiality of Arbitration Clauses Under Section 2-207
Under Uniform Commercial Code section 2-207, which addresses the
“battle of the forms” scenario, a term in the offeree’s form which
“materially alters” a term in the offeror’s form does not become part of the
contract between the contracting parties. 45 Is a mandatory arbitration clause
such a material alteration? The courts appear split.
For example, in Frances Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Burlington Industries,
Inc., the Supreme Court of North Carolina found that an arbitration
provision in an invoice included with a product shipment was not binding.
46
In that case, the parties entered into valid, complete oral contracts for the
sale of yarn, by telephone. 47 The defendant made multiple shipments of
yarn with invoices, which contained mandatory arbitration provisions. 48
The court noted that “the plaintiff did not sign and return to the defendant
any copy of such document, nor did it any time otherwise manifest to the
defendant its consent to the arbitration provision, unless its failure to object
thereto constitutes such a manifestation of assent.” 49 The court held that the
arbitration provision was “[b]eyond question” 50 a material alteration as it

45. U.C.C. § 2-207 (2000). Section 2-207 of the UCC was amended in 2003 but the
amendment has not been adopted by many states as of the date of this publication.
46. Frances Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 204 S.E.2d 834, 842 (N.C. 1974). Cf.
Marlene Indus. Corp. v. Carnac Textiles, Inc., 380 N.E.2d 239, 242 (N.Y. 1978) (finding that an
arbitration clause is material and may only become part of a contract if the parties expressly assent).
47. Frances Hosiery Mills, 204 S.E.2d at 841.
48. Id. at 836.
49. Id. at 842.
50. Id.
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would force the plaintiff to present its claim to an arbitration board in New
York rather than to a North Carolina court. 51
Other cases, however, suggest a willingness to enforce such provisions
in similar situations. 52 In Aceros Prefabricados, S.A. v. TradeArbed, Inc.,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit expressly rejected
the district court’s finding that “‘[a]s a matter of law, an arbitration provision
materially alters ones’ [sic] legal rights under a contract.’” 53 The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals found that the inclusion of an arbitration provision
in a contract did not constitute a material alteration under UCC section 2-207,
even though it was not expressly accepted by the plaintiff, because it did not
result in surprise or hardship to the plaintiff. 54 In reaching its conclusion, the
court stated that “[u]nder New York law, an arbitration agreement does not
result in surprise or hardship where arbitration is the custom and practice
within the relevant industry.” 55 The court further found that in the steel
business arbitration clauses are commonplace and the norm. 56
Our survey findings suggest that the inclusion or deletion of mandatory
arbitration clauses may be material to companies even though such clauses
are generally not viewed as “deal-breakers.” In other words, the addition or
deletion of mandatory arbitration clauses may be important or somewhat
important even if it is not so critically important as to prevent contract
formation. On the other hand, certain modifications to arbitration clauses,
such as changing the arbitration organization, may be minor and included as
part of the parties’ agreement.
IV. COMPARING THE RESULTS OF THE TWO STUDIES
A. Summarizing Significant Differences Between the Two Studies
Eisenberg, Miller, and Sherwin make several conclusions in their
study. In this Part, we examine their conclusions and discuss how our study
51. Id.
52. See N & D Fashions, Inc. v. DHJ Indus., Inc., 548 F.2d 722, 729 (8th Cir. 1976) (upholding
arbitration agreement in confirmation notice); Aceros Prefabricados, S.A. v. TradeArbed, Inc., 282 F.3d
92, 98 (2d Cir. 2002) (finding that arbitration provisions in seller’s confirmation orders became part of
contract between the parties). The courts’ opinions accord with comment 4 of section 2-207 of the UCC,
which states that “[e]xamples of typical clauses which would normally materially alter the contract and
so result in surprise or hardship if incorporated without express awareness by the other party . . . .”
U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 4 (2000).
53. Aceros Prefabricados, S.A., 282 F.3d at 99–100 (quoting Aceros Prefabricados, S.A. v.
TradeArbed, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 9387, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3445, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2001)).
54. Id. at 100–01.
55. Id. at 101.
56. Id. at 102.
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complements and extends or limits their findings. There are several
significant differences between Eisenberg, Miller, and Sherwin’s study and
our own that make such comparisons between the studies particularly
interesting. Eisenberg, Miller, and Sherwin’s study examined companies in
the “telecommunications, credit, and financial services industries.” 57 Our
study examined companies in a broader range of industries. Our findings,
therefore, may extend the applicability of Eisenberg, Miller, and Sherwin’s
findings to other industries or may limit them to their studied industries. 58
Interestingly, in our survey 67% of respondents in the financial services
sector responded that their form agreements contained mandatory
arbitration clauses. This finding suggests that companies in the financial
services sector may be more prone to include mandatory arbitration clauses in
their contracts than companies in other sectors, thus limiting Eisenberg,
Miller, and Sherwin’s findings of pro-mandatory arbitration clauses to the
industries they studied. Unfortunately, we hesitate to make such a conclusion
as only 6% of our respondents came from the financial services sector. 59
Furthermore, their study examined only consumer customer contracts
and compared those contracts with material, nonlabor contracts. 60 Our
study, on the other hand, examined only customer contracts, the vast
majority of which were with other businesses. Our study, therefore, may
help explain whether the disparity between consumer contracts and
material-nonemployee-contracts, established in Eisenberg, Miller, and
Sherwin’s study, is due to the difference between material and customer
contracts or the result of bargaining unevenness between businesses and
consumers. In other words, comparing the results of our two studies may
help identify whether it is the type of contract (customer or material) or the
status of the parties (individual consumer or large business) that determines
the prevalence of mandatory arbitration clauses.
Finally, our study specifically asked respondents their views about
arbitration, whereas Eisenberg, Miller, and Sherwin’s extrapolated companies’

57. Eisenberg et al., supra note 1, at 880.
58. Eisenberg, Miller, and Sherwin indicate that their study should have broader implication
for policy beyond the studied industries:
Corporations regularly defend their use of mandatory consumer arbitration
clauses by asserting arbitration’s superior fairness and efficiency over traditional
litigation. However, corporations’ selective use of arbitration clauses against
consumers, but not against each other, suggests that their use of mandatory
arbitration clauses may be based more on strategic advantage than on a belief that
corporations are better serving their customers.
Id. at 895.
59. See pp. 603–04, at tbl. 5.
60. Eisenberg, Miller, and Sherwin do not expressly define consumer.
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views from their data.61 Our findings regarding companies’ self-reported views
about mandatory arbitration clauses may be helpful in relation to Eisenberg,
Miller, and Sherwin’s conclusions regarding company views.
B. Prevalence of Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Customer Contracts
In Eisenberg, Miller, and Sherwin’s study, 76.9% of consumer
contracts contained mandatory arbitration clauses, whereas 23.1% of such
contracts did not. 62 They also found that only 6.1% of nonconsumer,
nonemployee material contracts contained mandatory arbitration clauses,
whereas 93.9% did not. 63 Because their study compared customer contracts
with non-customer, material contracts, this differential could be attributable
to the type of transaction rather than to an inconsistent attitude regarding
arbitration. 64
By comparison, our study found that of the 94% of respondent
companies that used standard form agreements, 45% of those agreements
contained mandatory arbitration clauses.
In addition, 36% of the 39 respondents that sell products only to other
businesses use mandatory arbitration clauses, compared to 51% of all of the
53 respondents that sell products to both businesses and consumers. Our
findings suggest that companies that sell products only or primarily to other
businesses are 15% less likely to use mandatory arbitration clauses than
those companies that sell to both businesses and consumers. This number,
however, is not statistically significant. 65 Of course, the use of mandatory
arbitration clauses with business customers must be viewed in light of
business customers’ ability to negotiate changes. Most significantly, 15% of
respondents permit changing arbitration from mandatory to optional, and
28% of respondents permit deletion of the arbitration clause altogether.
Therefore, while businesses may attempt to impose mandatory arbitration
clauses upon their business customers, they are also willing to ccommodate

61. There are, of course, weaknesses inherent in any self-reporting. Because we are testing
companies’ opinions, we are constrained by what companies report, subject to the potential for biases,
faulty perceptions, and dishonesty inherent in all self-reports.
62. Eisenberg et al., supra note 1, at 883.
63. Id.
64. In response to Eisenberg, Miller, and Sherwin’s research, Professor Ware observed that: “If
it’s a big, important contract, then you don’t put in an arbitration clause . . . . It’s entirely possible that
businesses are being consistent in using arbitration more for immaterial contracts than for material
contracts . . . .” Jonathan D. Glater, Companies Unlikely to Use Arbitration With Each Other, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 6, 2008, at B4.
65. The resultant p-value equals 0.146. Again, we used the software SAS to calculate this
figure.
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those business customers who insist upon changes. 66 Of course, it is simply
impractical for companies to accommodate such requests from consumer
customers because of the transaction costs of doing so on a mass scale.
Thus, our findings both support and qualify Eisenberg, Miller, and
Sherwin’s findings in several ways. Our study supports Eisenberg, Miller,
and Sherwin’s finding that companies are more likely to use mandatory
arbitration clauses with individual consumers than with other businesses.
The disparity, however, is not as stark as their study indicates. Our study
suggests that companies are more likely to use mandatory arbitration
clauses in standard customer contracts than in material agreements even
when the customer is another business. They are even more likely to do so
where the customer is a consumer rather than a business.
C. Rationale for Inclusion of Mandatory Arbitration Clauses
After considering other possible explanations, Eisenberg, Miller, and
Sherwin conclude that companies use mandatory arbitration clauses as a
means to avoid aggregate dispute resolution, namely class action law
suits. 67 In our study, we found the primary reason for including mandatory
arbitration clauses was to avoid litigation costs. Eight of the 15 respondents
(53%) who did business with both companies and consumers, chose
reduced litigation costs as the primary reason for using mandatory
arbitration clauses. Seventeen respondents (55%) who did business solely
with companies chose reduced litigation costs as the primary reason for
using mandatory arbitration clauses. 68
The respondents’ answers in our study to the question “what is the
primary reason for the arbitration clause,” is not necessarily inconsistent
with Eisenberg, Miller, and Sherwin’s conclusion. As previously noted, our
survey was sent out prior to the publication of their study. Consequently,
we did not tailor our questions to their findings, and did not provide the
avoidance of aggregate dispute resolution as a possible reason for
arbitration clauses. Those respondents who have both businesses and
consumers as customers may have been thinking of class action law suits
when they answered that the primary reason for the arbitration clause was to
reduce litigation costs, as defending such suits tends to be costly. In
addition, because our respondents dealt primarily with business customers,
their primary concern may not have been the avoidance of aggregate
66. See supra p. 610, at tbl. 14.
67. Eisenberg et al., supra note 1, at 893.
68. Some respondents checked more than one response, which explains why total percentages
for this question exceed 100%.
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dispute resolution. Thus, for those businesses that deal primarily with
consumer customers, the primary purpose for mandatory arbitration clauses
may indeed be the avoidance of aggregate dispute resolution.
The frequent inclusion of mandatory arbitration clauses in business
customer contracts, however, does suggest there are reasons other than the
avoidance of aggregate dispute resolution for their inclusion in customer
contracts. Eisenberg, Miller, and Sherwin do not specify where their subject
companies conduct business or whether they have international customers.
Our study suggests that for companies that conduct business internationally,
arbitration with a familiar arbitral organization may be preferable to the
vagaries and uncertainties of foreign law in a foreign court. For example, of
the 20 companies that have international customers (i.e., in a country other
than where the company is headquartered), 11 of them, or 55%, use
mandatory arbitration clauses, which hints that the use of such clauses may
be a norm in international transactions. In other words, if non-U.S.
companies tend to regularly use mandatory arbitration clauses, U.S.
companies that deal with these companies may incorporate such clauses in
their agreements in order to conform with internationally accepted
commercial standards. 69
In addition, as previously noted, 73% of respondents stated that they
had agreed to mandatory arbitration clauses in other company contracts on
behalf of their own companies. Their willingness to do so—and that they
were asked to do so at all—indicates that mandatory arbitration clauses are
not confined to consumer customer contracts.
CONCLUSIONS
The findings in our study may help companies to better understand
attitudes about arbitration and assist in contract negotiations. Our findings,
in conjunction with the Eisenberg, Miller, and Sherwin study, indicate that
businesses are more likely to include mandatory arbitration clauses in their
standard customer contracts than in their material-nonemployee contracts
69. Home state familiarity and convenience is a consideration even domestically. See Florencia
Marotta-Wurgler, “Unfair” Dispute Resolution Clauses: Much Ado About Nothing? in BOILERPLATE:
FOUNDATIONS OF MARKET CONTRACTS 64 (Omni Ben-Shahar, ed., 2007). Marotta-Wurgler notes that
arbitration clauses were “rare” in her sample of consumer contracts and that
sellers who select arbitration invariably select the law of the state in which they
are headquartered. The same is true for arbitration location. In fact, about 50
percent of arbitration clauses in the EULAs of consumer-oriented products select
California law and California venue. As is well known, California affords many
protections to consumers in arbitration.
Id.
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with other businesses. The preference for mandatory arbitration clauses in
customer contracts appears to be somewhat greater where the customer is a
consumer rather than a business. Our study also suggests that the primary
reason for mandatory arbitration clauses in customer contracts where the
customer is a business is the avoidance of uncertainty and expenses
associated with litigation, especially in a foreign jurisdiction. This finding
may suggest an additional or alternative rationale to Eisenberg, Miller, and
Sherwin’s conclusion that the primary reason for mandatory arbitration
clauses in customer contracts with consumers is the avoidance of aggregate
dispute resolution.
Finally, our study may help courts determine the materiality of
arbitration clauses in standard form agreements between two commercial
entities under UCC section 2-207. Our study indicates that the addition or
deletion of arbitration clauses is material, but that certain alterations to these
clauses, such as change of arbitration body, are not.
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